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Limiting Viral Spread: Automated 
Cyber Operations and the 
Principles of Distinction and 
Discrimination in the Grey Zone
Abstract: The fact that States resort to automated cyber operations like NotPetya, 
which spread virally and have indiscriminate effects, raises the question of how the 
use of these might be regulated. As automated operations have thus far fallen below the 
threshold of the use of force, the letter of international humanitarian law (IHL) does not 
provide such regulation. In IHL, the principles of distinction and discrimination hold 
that attacks should in their targeting distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks must not be 
indiscriminate, and operations that might foreseeably spread to affect civilian objects 
are prohibited. This paper draws inspiration from the legal principles of distinction 
and discrimination to suggest a non-binding norm for responsible State behaviour 
with regard to automated operations that fall below the threshold of the use of force: 
the norm proposes that States should design cyber operations so as to prevent them 
from indiscriminately inflicting damage. The paper finds that in the case of automated 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Automated State-led cyber operations have the potential to spread and affect systems 
uncontrollably. The WannaCry and NotPetya attacks of 2017 are the most pressing 
examples of operations that were not designed to limit harmful effects on systems, 
which meant that they were able to destroy data on networks supporting a wide 
range of services, from national healthcare to international commercial shipping. 
Meanwhile, existing legal frameworks, particularly international humanitarian law 
(IHL), are insufficient to regulate conduct with reference to attacks like WannaCry 
and NotPetya that fall below the threshold of the use of force.1 In this paper, drawing 
inspiration from IHL, we propose a new norm against indiscriminate cyber operations 
below the threshold of the use of force. The norm holds that States should design cyber 
operations so as to prevent them from indiscriminately inflicting damage. While the 
norm draws inspiration from IHL, it deviates from IHL in that it does not distinguish 
between lawful and unlawful objects as categories. Instead, any operation that does 
not seek to target a malware’s payload at a particular system; that is, lacks any form of 
distinction and discrimination, would be considered a violation of the norm. 
In considering how we might borrow from the ideas of legal weapons review and 
targeting law in the context of regulating automated cyber operations, we find that 
such operations challenge the classic IHL distinction between the ‘nature’ and ‘use’ 
of weapons. In order to conform to the norm, we argue that responsible State actors 
should conduct a normative review of cyber operations at the design stage to ensure 
1 While the initial NotPetya attack was launched in the context of an armed conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine, the malware spread globally and inflicted most of its damage outside Ukraine. The operation itself 
fell below the threshold of the use of force as it did not cause physical injury or significant damage beyond 
economic and data losses. For a longer discussion on the application of international law to NotPetya see: 
Michael Schmitt and Jeffrey Biller, ‘The NotPetya Cyber Operation as a Case Study of International Law’, 
EJIL: Talk! (blog), 11 July 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-notpetya-cyber-operation-as-a-case-study-of-
international-law/.
cyber operations, a distinction between the nature of the operation and the use of the 
operation does not make sense because the design (nature) of the malware defines the 
use. In order to conform with the norm, responsible States should conduct a review 
of cyber operations prior to their execution. Finally, as the paper illustrates with a 
comparative analysis of NotPetya and Stuxnet, the post-incident forensic analysis of 
an operation can allow third parties and victims to determine whether the operation’s 
designer conformed with the norm. This can help set a normative benchmark by 
providing a basis upon which States may call out unacceptable behaviour.
Keywords: automated cyber attacks, international humanitarian law, indiscriminate 
attacks, cyber norms, sub-threshold operations
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that the operations are designed to limit harmful effects. This recommendation stems 
directly from the existing recognition in the scholarly literature that cyber weapons 
are not ‘inherently indiscriminate’ and can be designed so as to accomplish the 
perpetrator’s goals without causing significant damage beyond the intended target.2
The paper is divided into three sections. First, referring particularly to recent 
attribution statements and State contributions to the Open-Ended Working Group on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security (OEWG), we argue that States are starting to get worried about 
automated cyber attacks, which indicates the need for the development of a norm 
against indiscriminate sub-threshold operations. Second, we discuss why a distinction 
between ‘nature’ and ‘use’ does not make sense in the context of automated cyber 
operations and propose that responsible States should conduct a ‘normative’ review 
of the design of cyber operations prior to their launch. Third, we compare and contrast 
two well-known cyber operations, NotPetya and Stuxnet, to show how a post-incident 
analysis of an operation can reveal whether the attacker sought to limit the operation’s 
uncontrolled harmful effects.
2. THE NEED FOR A NORM TO LIMIT AUTOMATED 
ATTACKS BELOW THE THRESHOLD OF AN ARMED 
ATTACK 
NotPetya, and WannaCry before it, forced States to think about the nature and the 
permissibility of automated cyber attacks below the threshold of armed conflict. 
The financial and operational damage done, and the indiscriminate way in which the 
malware spread, set these attacks apart. When a number of States coordinated their 
attributions of the NotPetya attack to Russia, the US and the UK made references to 
its automated nature. The UK condemned ‘its indiscriminate design’ that caused it to 
spread beyond its primary Ukrainian targets.3 The United States called it out in light 
of the ongoing conflict between Russian and Ukraine but also underlined that ‘this 
was … a reckless and indiscriminate cyber attack that will be met with international 
consequences’.4 The unofficial American condemnation was a lot harsher. Tom 
Bossert, President Trump’s homeland security advisor, was adamant that a spoken or 
unspoken red line around how the United States expects fellow countries to behave on 
the internet had been violated: ‘The United States thinks any malware that propagates 
recklessly, without bounds, violates every standard and expectation of proportionality 
2 Steven M. Bellovin, Susan Landau, and Herbert S. Lin, ‘Limiting the Undesired Impact of Cyber 
Weapons: Technical Requirements and Policy Implications’, Journal of Cybersecurity 3, no. 1 (2017): 61.
3 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Office Minister Condemns Russia for NotPetya Attacks’, 
GOV.UK, 15 February 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-condemns-
russia-for-notpetya-attacks.
4 White House, ‘Statement from the Press Secretary’, 15 February 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.
gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-25/ .
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5 Cited in: Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most 
Dangerous Hackers (New York: Doubleday, 2019), 244.
6 For some background on these processes see: Tim Maurer, ‘A Dose of Realism: The Contestation and 
Politics of Cyber Norms’, Hague Journal of the Rule of Law (2019): 1–23; Dennis Broeders and Bibi van 
den Berg, ‘Governing Cyberspace. Behavior, Power, and Diplomacy’, in Governing Cyberspace. Behavior, 
Power, and Diplomacy, eds. Dennis Broeders and Bibi van den Berg (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2020), 1–15; Dennis Broeders (2021) ‘The (im)possibilities of addressing election interference and the 
public core of the internet in the UN GGE and OEWG: a mid-process assessment’, Journal of Cyber 
Policy, forthcoming.
7 UNODA, ‘Open-Ended Working Group’, accessed 25 December 2020, https://www.un.org/disarmament/
open-ended-working-group/.
8 Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA et al., ‘Position Paper on Switzerland’s Participation 
in the 2019-2020 UN Open-Ended Working Group on “Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security” and the 2019-2021 UN Group 
of Governmental Experts on “Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace in the Context 
of International Security”’, January 2020, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/switzerland-position-paper-oewg-gge-final.pdf.
9 ‘Initial “Pre-Draft” of the Report of the OEWG on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’, n.d., https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/03/200311-Pre-Draft-OEWG-ICT.pdf.
10 ‘Second “Pre-Draft” of the Report of the OEWG on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’, n.d., https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/200527-oewg-ict-revised-pre-draft.pdf.
and discrimination. Truly responsible nations do not behave this way.’5 However, 
given that attacks like NotPetya take place below the threshold of the use of force 
– or are at least not called out by States as a use of force – the principles of IHL do 
not apply. In other words, there is no easy resort to principles of discrimination and 
proportionality to judge an indiscriminate and viral attack below the threshold.
State worries about indiscriminate cyber attacks have also surfaced in the recent and 
ongoing rounds of the UN processes on determining responsible State behaviour in 
cyberspace. The OEWG wrapped up its deliberations with a report in March 2021 and 
the parallel process of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) is still yet 
to be finalised.6 States can submit their contributions in writing to the OEWG and, 
in contrast to the closed diplomatic process of the UN GGE, have them published 
on the OEWG website.7 In January 2020, Switzerland voiced its concerns: ‘While 
the majority of cyber operations have so far been executed in a precise and targeted 
manner from a technical point of view, we have recently seen cases within which 
cyber tools were used at random and causing unintended harmful effects.’8 Both the 
first9 and the second10 pre-drafts of the report included an unchanged reference to this 
problem in the threat section: ‘Pursuit of increasing automation and autonomy in ICT 
operations was also put forward as a specific concern.’ In their responses to the first 
draft report, States like Brazil, Ecuador and the Netherlands explicitly supported the 
inclusion of this concern, the latter adding that ‘[t]hese independently operating and 
developing cyber operations are, once launched, outside the control of the initiators, 
and therefore the adherence to the framework of responsible behaviour including 
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international law cannot be ensured’.11 As the final OEWG report12 only reflects 
consensus opinions, the reference to indiscriminate cyber attacks was dropped there 
and moved to the Chair’s summary.13 This document contains issues that were put 
forward by multiple states but did not achieve consensus and will be discussed further 
in coming iterations of the UN processes on responsible behaviour in cyberspace. 
At this point two things need to be disentangled. First, there is a conflation of 
automation and autonomy. While these are partly overlapping concepts, we focus in 
this paper on automation rather than autonomy. Autonomy is most fiercely debated in 
the context of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), where a whole range 
of ethical and legal questions are raised on the issue of (the lack of) human control 
and computer autonomy in military weapons and systems.14 The debate on artificial 
intelligence (AI) enabled cyber attacks also touches on the issue of autonomy, as 
AI could enable malware to react autonomously to changing circumstances and 
possibilities. This debate is relatively overhyped: for most attackers, AI is not needed 
as the available cyber automation techniques serve their purposes.15 This paper 
focuses on the automated, viral quality of cyber attacks like NotPetya and the way 
they spread indiscriminately. Second, if States flag automation as a problem, one 
of the next questions is whether this can be addressed by international law or by 
non-binding norms (or both). As indicated above, no State has formally stated that 
NotPetya violated any principles of international law, let alone IHL. Even though 
NotPetya seemed ‘most poised to burst out of the grey zone between war and peace’, 
State reactions indicate that it did not.16 However, there have been some efforts to 
develop non-binding norms to acknowledge and address the problem of automated 
cyber attacks. The 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace explicitly 
acknowledges the emergence of ‘malicious cyber activities in peacetime’ that are 
‘threatening or resulting in significant, indiscriminate or systemic harm to individuals 
11 The Kingdom of the Netherlands’ Response to the Pre-Draft Report of the OEWG, n.d., https://front.un-
arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/kingdom-of-the-netherlands-response-pre-draft-oewg.pdf.
12 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security Final Substantive Report’ 
(United Nations, 10 March 2021), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Final-report-A-
AC.290-2021-CRP.2.pdf.
13 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security Third substantive session 
8–12 March 2021 Chair’s Summary’ (United Nations, 10 March 2021), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/03/Chairs-Summary-A-AC.290-2021-CRP.3-technical-reissue.pdf.
14 Michael C. Horowitz, ‘The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare: Assessing the Debate over Autonomous 
Weapons’, American Academy of Arts & Sciences 145, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 25–36; Kenneth Anderson 
and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation 
under International Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199680832.001.0001; Paul Scharre, Army 
of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, n.d.).
15 Ben Buchanan et al., ‘Automating Cyber Attacks’ (Washington, D.C.: Center for Security and Emerging 
Technology, November 2020).
16 Ben Buchanan, The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2020), 302.
64
and critical infrastructure’ and ‘welcome[s] calls for their improved protection’.17 
The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace covers large-scale automated 
attacks by asserting that ‘state and non-state actors should not commandeer the general 
public’s ICT resources for use as botnets or for similar purposes’.18 This norm seems 
primarily focused on the use of botnets, but the ‘similar purposes’ clause might be 
applicable to automated attacks like NotPetya. 
In this paper we argue that viral, automated attacks could be addressed by a non-
binding norm for responsible State behaviour below the threshold of the use of force 
that draws inspiration from legal principles derived from IHL. Norms have been 
constructed in this way before. Some of the eleven norms in the 2015 UN GGE report 
are reiterations of legal principles – such as the principle of due diligence or respect for 
human rights law – indicating that norms and laws are perhaps more of a continuum 
than a strict dichotomy.19 Inspired by the principles of distinction and discrimination 
in IHL, this norm would bar indiscriminate cyber operations below the threshold of the 
use of force. First, under IHL, the legality of a weapon (system) is among other things 
determined by the fact that the weapon system cannot be indiscriminate by nature. 
This rule refers to the ‘nature of the weapon in the uses for which it was designed 
or, as some authorities have put it, its “normal” uses; i.e., the uses for which it was 
intended’.20 Second, there is the matter of the indiscriminate use of the weapon, which 
is covered under targeting law. The principle of distinction or discrimination requires 
that ‘a combatant, using reasonable judgment in the circumstances, distinguish 
between combatants and civilians, as well as between military and civilian objects’.21 
The following section will turn to the issues that the legal review of weapons poses 
for automated cyber operations. It will argue that the distinction between nature and 
use is empty for automated cyber operations and will propose a normative review to 
prevent the launch of indiscriminate cyber operations.
17 ‘Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace’, 12 November 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
IMG/pdf/paris_call_cyber_cle443433-1.pdf.
18 GCSC, ‘Advancing Cyberstability. Final Report of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace’, 
November 2019, https://cyberstability.org/report/.
19 Liisi Adamson, ‘International Law and International Cyber Norms: A Continuum?’, in Governing 
Cyberspace: Behaviour, Power and Diplomacy, eds. Dennis Broeders and Bibi van den Berg (London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2020).
20 Anderson and Waxman, ‘Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation 
under International Law’, 1105.
21 Ibid.
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3. A NORMATIVE REVIEW FOR CYBER OPERATIONS?
The two-fold normative categorisation detaching indiscriminate ‘use’ from 
indiscriminate ‘nature’ has long been a part of the legal debate on cyber operations.22 
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(Tallinn Manual 2.0) in fact folds, in its Rule 103, the indiscriminate use and nature 
dichotomy into its definition of cyber weapons, understood as ‘cyber means of warfare 
that are used, designed, or intended to be used to cause injury to, or death of, persons 
or damage to, or destruction of, objects’.23 The definition of cyber weapons is thus 
embedded into that of cyber attacks (Rule 92) insofar as cyber weapons are intended 
to execute cyber attacks.24 In addition, through Rule 105, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
prohibits cyber weapons that are ‘inherently indiscriminate’ and can be considered, 
fundamentally, as ‘shots in the dark’. In particular, this rule defines that ‘means or 
methods of cyber warfare are indiscriminate by nature when they cannot be: (a) 
directed at a specific military objective, or (b) limited in their effects as required by 
the law of armed conflict and consequently are of a nature to strike military objectives 
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction’. Separating intentional use from 
‘natural’ capability constitutes, however, a problematic endeavour in the assessment of 
cyber attacks, particularly when it comes to automated operations. Malware-like and 
automated cyber attacks propagate and detect unpatched vulnerabilities automatically, 
and thus their intentionality becomes a question of pure design. In these terms, the 
modus operandi of automated malware defies the very ‘nature’ vs ‘use’ dichotomy 
associated with indiscriminate attacks.
The indiscriminate use of a cyber weapon has also been traditionally defined in 
relation to the type of harm caused (as evidenced by Rule 103 above). This is also 
problematic, however, because, putting aside the fact that IHL does not apply below 
the threshold of armed attack,25 the rules applying to weaponry tend to govern 
primarily physical effects of the kind that malware seldom achieves.26 For example, 
22 Herb Lin, ‘Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross 
94, no. 886 (Summer 2012): 515–31; Michael N. Schmitt and Sean Watts, ‘The Decline of International 
Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare’, Texas International Law Journal 50 
(2015): 189.
23 Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 452.
24 It must be noted that the manual explicitly rules out “the destruction of data” from its definition of cyber 
attack, unless the destruction of data leads to physical harm. For an alternative perspective, see: Kubo 
Mačák, ‘Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International 
Humanitarian Law’, Israel Law Review 48, no. 1 (March 2015): 55–80, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0021223714000260.
25 Specifically with reference to the legal obligation to conduct a cyber weapons review, Kudláčková et. 
al. find that there is no legal obligation for States to conduct a weapons review outside Article 36 of 
Additional Protocol I, which is not triggered below the threshold of armed conflict. See: I. Kudláčková, D. 
Wallace, and J. Harašta, ‘Cyber Weapons Review in Situations Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict’, 
in 2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), vol. 1300, 2020, 97–112, https://doi.
org/10.23919/CyCon49761.2020.9131728.
26 See: CCDCOE, ‘Scenario 10: Legal Review of Cyber Weapons’, Cyber Law Toolkit, n.d., https://cyberlaw.
ccdcoe.org/wiki/Scenario_10:_Legal_review_of_cyber_weapons .
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when analysing NotPetya in light of this effects-based criterion for indiscriminate 
use, it becomes apparent that the fake ransomware, which destroyed data, hardly 
compares to the physical harm caused by a weapon. Above all, this indicates how 
a harm-based understanding of cyber weapons hinders the protection of networks 
below the threshold.
States have recently attempted to address this obstacle by ‘softening’ the harm 
requirement in their interpretations of how IHL, and in particular Additional Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions,27 applies to cyberspace. For example, France officially 
embraced a softer requirement for a cyber operation to rise to the level of armed 
attack (as defined for the purpose of IHL in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I28): 
for France, it suffices that the cyber weapon disables systems to the point that they 
are incapacitated ‘to provide the service for which they were implemented, whether 
temporarily or permanently, reversibly or not’.29 By doing so, the definition of cyber 
weapons interestingly shifts from harm to effects.
The legal instrument tasked with assessing the conformity of new cyber weapons 
to IHL standards has been outlined through Tallinn Manual 2.0’s Rule 110, which 
translates the legal review of weapons (as instituted by Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I30)to the context of cyber operations: ‘All states are required to ensure that 
the cyber means of warfare that they acquire or use, comply with the rules of the 
law of armed conflict that bind them.’ While constituting an important tool for the 
safeguarding of the principles of distinction and discrimination in wartime, a standard 
legal review of cyber weapons – as prescribed by the Tallinn Manual 2.0 – cannot 
be applied to automated cyber operations below the threshold of armed conflict.31 
Additionally, as software remains subject to frequent changes and self-remodulations, 
it would be impractical to provide a new standard legal review each time software is 
edited.32
With State-sponsored cyber operations primarily occurring in peacetime and with 
no physical harm, a different normative approach is required to assess them and to 
27 The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977) is a fundamental document for IHL as it 
reaffirms and modernizes the principles of the original Geneva Conventions (1949), https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470. 
28 Article 49 of the Additional Protocol I states that: ‘“Attacks” means acts of violence against the adversary, 
whether in offence or in defence.’
29 French Ministry of the Armies, ‘International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace’, September 2019, 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operati
ons+in+cyberspace.pdf.  
30 Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I states that: ‘In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a 
new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any 
other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.’
31 Natalia Jevglevskaja, ‘Weapons Review Obligation under Customary International Law’, International 
Law Studies 94 (2018): 186–221.
32 Gary Brown and Andrew Metcalf, ‘Easier Said than Done: Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons’, SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 12 February 2014), 133, https://doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2400530 .
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prevent the indiscriminate infliction of damage. This article therefore proposes to take 
the spirit of the principles of distinction and discrimination outside the stringent legal 
framework of IHL as a negative norm that: 1. applies to indiscriminate cyber operations 
below the threshold; 2. regards the effects of cyber operations beyond ‘physical harm’; 
3. proposes a ‘normative’ review of cyber operations focusing on nature/design; and 
thus, 4. creates a normative benchmark for responsible State behaviour, which can 
be used to hold States accountable when they fail to prevent the viral spread of their 
cyber operations. With the distinction between indiscriminate use and indiscriminate 
nature blurring away in the context of automated cyber operations, a normative review 
of cyber operations should prioritise the assessment of their ‘design’. To this end, we 
use a conceptualisation of a cyber operation that primarily focuses on its nature and 
thus constitutes ‘the combination of a propagation method, exploits, and a payload 
designed to create destructive physical or digital effects’.33 Envisioning nature and 
use as inseparable, the next section will discuss on the basis of two contrasting cyber 
operations how a normative review can reveal a cyber operation’s discriminate or 
indiscriminate design.
4. SETTING THE STANDARD IN PRACTICE: 
COMPARING STUXNET AND NOTPETYA 
Applying a norm against indiscriminate sub-threshold cyber operations would require 
States to conduct a review of each operation to ascertain that the design of the operation 
reflects the attacker’s intent to limit its uncontrolled harmful effects (including the 
destruction of data). This section will demonstrate how the post-incident forensic 
analysis of an operation, including the reverse-engineering of malware, can allow 
third parties and victims to determine whether an attacker conformed to the norm. 
Such analyses are important, as their findings provide a basis on which States can call 
out unacceptable behaviour and thus set a normative benchmark. Using the examples 
of NotPetya and Stuxnet, the section will demonstrate how, once the malware had 
been found ‘in the wild’, that is, once the malware had spread among real-world 
computers (as opposed to test systems),34 interested parties were able to determine 
whether the operations were indiscriminate in nature from the technical analysis of 
the malware code.
NotPetya 
NotPetya, while masquerading as ransomware, in fact irreversibly encrypted every 
infected machine’s master boot record, thus effectively destroying these computers.35 
As a result of the operation, Maersk, just one of NotPetya’s many victims, reported 
33 Trey Herr, ‘PrEP: A Framework for Malware & Cyber Weapons’, Journal of Information Warfare 13, no. 1 
(2014): 87–106.
34 Trend Micro, ‘In-the-Wild - Definition - Trend Micro USA’, Trend Micro, accessed 23 November 2020, 
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/in-the-wild.
35 Buchanan et al., ‘Automating Cyber Attacks’, 9.
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the loss of 49,000 laptops and 3,500 servers.36 There are two technical characteristics 
of NotPetya which reveal that it did not conform to the normative principle of 
discrimination at the design stages. First, an analysis of what the MITRE ATT&CK 
Framework37 terms the ‘initial access vector’ stage of the operation reveals that 
the attackers compromised the software update system for the M.E.Doc financial 
application.38 In order to engineer this, they had first stolen the credentials of an 
M.E.Doc administrator to gain control of M.E.Doc’s upgrade server to modify the 
software update so that it would include a ‘backdoored’ module.39 M.E.Doc is the 
most popular accounting software in Ukraine, used widely by any organisation that 
files taxes or conducts business in the country, including multinational corporations.40 
The attackers’ choice of M.E.Doc as the attack vector, therefore, already suggests 
that the attackers did not pay attention to distinguishing between targets. In addition, 
when installed by users, the malicious update allowed the attackers to collect email 
usernames and passwords from organisations that use M.E.Doc and their EDRPOU 
numbers; these numbers are unique legal entity identifiers given to every organisation 
that conducts business in Ukraine.41 The fact that the attackers engineered the malware 
to collect the numbers is important, as it indicates that they intended for it to spread 
widely and wanted to identify exactly which organisation was running the backdoored 
M.E.Doc software.42 We can therefore conclude from just the analysis of NotPetya’s 
method of delivery that it was not designed to discriminate between systems in its 
method of delivery.
The analyses of the ‘lateral movement’ stage, in which the adversary moves from one 
system to the next within a network, and the ‘impact’43 stage, where the adversary 
tries to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy systems or data, reveal a second important 
characteristic: the malware’s high level of automation and inability to distinguish 
between targets before installing and releasing its payload. These stages of the 
operation indicate that NotPetya’s designers did not seek to limit in any way the 
malware’s uncontrolled harmful effects.
36 Rae Ritchie, ‘Maersk: Springing Back from a Catastrophic Cyber-Attack | I-CIO’, I - Global Intelligence 
for Digital Leaders, August 2019, https://www.i-cio.com/management/insight/item/maersk-springing-back-
from-a-catastrophic-cyber-attack.
37 The framework is a matrix of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations, which 
in a post-mortem analysis of an operation helps determine the actions an attacker might have taken. See: 
The MITRE Corporation, ‘Matrix: Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CKTM’, MITRE ATT&CKTM, 2018, https://
attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/; Chris Brook, ‘What Is the MITRE ATT&CK Framework?’, Digital 
Guardian, 23 April 2020, https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-mitre-attck-framework.
38 Mark Simos, ‘Overview of Petya, a Rapid Cyberattack’, Microsoft Security, 5 February 2018, https://www.
microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/02/05/overview-of-petya-a-rapid-cyberattack/.
39 David Maynor et al., ‘The MeDoc Connection’, Cisco Talos (blog), 5 July 2017, http://blog.
talosintelligence.com/2017/07/the-medoc-connection.html; Anton Cherepanov, ‘Analysis of TeleBots’ 
Cunning Backdoor’, WeLiveSecurity, 4 July 2017, https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/04/analysis-
of-telebots-cunning-backdoor/.
40 Greenberg, Sandworm, 179; Maynor et al., ‘The MeDoc Connection’.
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In order to propagate across systems, the NotPetya malware used a number of methods.44 
The first, and most effective, was the use of a modified version of Mimikatz, a popular 
open-source tool used to steal user login credentials from computer memory.45 Once 
it had recovered the Windows login credentials from the machine of an infected 
administrative user, the malware used common Windows management tools to spread 
itself automatically to other systems on the same network.46 The second method used 
by the malware to propagate was through the use of the EternalBlue exploit tool. 
EternalBlue utilises the CVE-2017-0144 vulnerability in the Server Message Block 
(SMB) protocol47 on unpatched Windows systems to allow attackers to remotely 
infect all the systems on a given network in minutes.48 By designing the malware 
so that it used not only EternalBlue but also the modified version of Mimikatz, the 
attackers ensured that it would self-propagate even to machines that were running 
an updated version of Windows.49 NotPetya was therefore designed to behave like 
an automated worm, spreading via trusted networks rather than the internet, which 
meant that it bypassed the processes put in place to prevent ransomware attacks.50 
The presence of modified Mimikatz and EternalBlue in the malware code reveals 
that it was not intended to discriminate between targets, but instead was designed to 
propagate as widely and as quickly as possible. In fact, coupling automated credential 
theft and re-use with vulnerability exploitation was what made NotPetya uniquely 
able to propagate on the widest scale in the history of cyber attacks.51 Most crucially, 
however, the malware had no mechanism to distinguish between targets prior to 
installing its payload: once it had spread to a new host, it automatically scanned other 
systems for their vulnerability to the SMB exploit in order to release its payload there 
as well.52 Therefore, the indiscriminate, automated propagation and installation of 
malware meant that the destruction wrought by NotPetya had global ramifications. 
Stuxnet
Like NotPetya, Stuxnet was also a worm with the capacity to propagate automatically, 
but Stuxnet serves as a good example of how a technical analysis of an operation can 
reveal the attackers’ intent to limit indiscriminate spread and destruction. In the initial 
44 CISA, ‘Petya Ransomware’, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, 1 July 2017, https://us-cert.
cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A.
45 Alexander Chiu, ‘New Ransomware Variant “Nyetya” Compromises Systems Worldwide’, Cisco Talos 
(blog), 27 June 2017, http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html.
46 CISA; James Maude, ‘NotPetya Ransomware: Attack Analysis | BeyondTrust’, BeyondTrust, 20 October 
2017, https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/notpetya-ransomware-attack-analysis; Greenberg, 
Sandworm, 182.
47 The SMBv1 protocol is a network communication protocol that was developed in 1983 to enable 
computers on a network to share access to files, printers, and ports. See: Carly Burdova, ‘What Is 
EternalBlue and Why Is the MS17-010 Exploit Still Relevant?’, Avast, 18 June 2020, https://www.avast.
com/c-eternalblue.
48 CISA.
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50 NCSC, ‘Russian Military “Almost Certainly” Responsible for Destructive 2017 Cyber Attack’, National 





access stage, in order to deliver the first iteration of the Stuxnet malware into the 
systems of the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in Iran, which was air-gapped, the 
perpetrators recruited a mole to physically infect a USB flash drive with the malware, 
which was then plugged into the centrifuge systems at the plant.53 Prior to delivering 
the malware on the USB drive, the mole had visited Natanz a number of times in 
order to collect detailed information on the configuration of its systems. This allowed 
the attackers to update the code several times before launching the operation and 
ensure that the malware would only deliver its payload when it found a very specific 
configuration of equipment and network conditions (this stage will be elaborated on 
later).54 An analysis of the intrusion vector for this first version of Stuxnet reveals 
that it was designed as a ‘precision attack’: the malware was injected into only one 
target network, that of the Natanz facility, and was intended to spread to systems only 
‘within’ that network.55
In the second iteration of the operation, to deliver a modified version of the malware, 
rather than using a mole, the attackers infected the systems of five unwitting external 
Natanz contractors.56 It was this change in the malware’s delivery, which meant that 
it eventually spread outside Natanz. Although the malware was designed to only 
propagate automatically in ‘trusted networks’, the infection of the contractors’ systems 
meant that the malware spread to the contractors’ other customers, most likely through 
removable drives. It then spread through trusted networks, which are often channelled 
via the internet, and ultimately ended up infecting over 100,000 computer systems 
globally.57 It was at this stage that the malware ‘simply went off task’.58 However, 
comparing the lateral movement stages of the NotPetya and Stuxnet operations, there 
is one crucial difference: while the malware spread far and wide in both cases, Stuxnet 
did not destroy any systems that were not its intended target because it was designed 
to only deliver its payload to specific types of Simatic programmable logic controller 
(PLC) devices.59 Having detected a Simatic PLC, Stuxnet then verified whether it was 
connected to a specific type of frequency converter running at 807–1,210 Hz, which 
was the range within which Natanz was known to run its centrifuges.60 When Stuxnet 
detected these specific configurations, it released its payload, causing the PLCs to run 
at different speeds; when it did not, it withheld the payload.61 Therefore, although 
53 Kim Zetter and Huib Modderkolk, ‘Revealed: How a Secret Dutch Mole Aided the U.S.-Israeli Stuxnet 
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Stuxnet spread in a worm-like fashion, it did not have uncontrolled harmful effects 
as the malware did not release the payload in systems outside Natanz.62 For example, 
Chevron, the energy company, was infected by the Stuxnet malware, but its systems 
did not sustain any damage.63 In fact, so precise was Stuxnet’s targeting capability 
that Richard Clarke, a former long-term US counterterrorism chief, commented that it 
felt like it had been ‘written by or governed by a team of Washington lawyers’ to limit 
its collateral damage.64 We can therefore conclude that because Stuxnet withheld its 
payload outside Natanz, the spread to other networks outside the Iranian nuclear plant 
was highly likely to have been unintentional, while the avoidance of indiscriminate 
harmful effects was fully intentional. Consequently, the analysis of Stuxnet’s code 
reveals design features which indicate that, unlike NotPetya, it complied with the 
norm of discrimination. Table I compares and summarises the two operations.
TABLE I: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF NOTPETYA AND STUXNET MALWARE
As the two examples illustrate, the ability to reverse-engineer malware once it has been 
found ‘in the wild’ provides a basis for judging if in the design of a cyber operation 
the perpetrator has complied with the norm against indiscriminate operations. In 
particular, an operation can be judged as indiscriminate if the analysis reveals that the 
malware contained no mechanism for distinguishing between ‘innocent’ systems and 
its intended target prior to installing its payload. Other indications of an operation’s lack 
62 It is important to note that although the Stuxnet malware did not release its payload in non-target systems, 
the attackers chose not to delete the malware from non-target systems, despite most likely having the 
capability to do so. See: Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First 
Digital Weapon, First Edition (New York: Crown Publishers, 2014).
63 Lee, ‘Stuxnet Infected Chevron’.
64 Clarke cited in: Ron Rosenbaum, ‘Richard Clarke on Who Was Behind the Stuxnet Attack’, Smithsonian 






Via backdoor implanted in M.E.Doc 
software update known to be used 
widely by civilians in Ukraine. This 
shows that the malware was meant to 
enter thousands of networks.
Via an external drive inserted directly into a 
single target network; and via the machines 
of 5 external contractors known to work at 
Natanz. This shows the malware was meant 
to enter only one network.
Lateral 
movement
Via trusted networks using Mimikatz 
and EternalBlue. This shows the 
malware was meant to spread rapidly 
into every system on the thousands of 
networks it entered.
Via trusted networks using a number of 
vulnerabilities including zero days. This 
shows that the malware was intended to 
spread, but from the ‘impact’ stage we can 
determine that the designers most likely 
wanted the malware to spread only in the 
Natanz network.
Impact Release of malicious payload 
regardless of environment 
specifications.
Release of payload only under very specific 
conditions.
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of attention to discrimination in the design stages are the malware’s infection vector 
and spreading mechanisms. If the initial access vector targets thousands of networks 
simultaneously, it raises the likelihood that the operation will be indiscriminate. 
In terms of propagation, as the analysis of Stuxnet showed, the incorporation of 
propagation mechanisms into the malware in itself does not necessarily indicate the 
attacker’s lack of intent to limit the operation. Instead, propagation coupled with the 
malware’s inability to distinguish between systems in delivering its payload is what 
betrays the attackers’ inattention to discrimination.65
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the legal principles of distinction and discrimination 
provide inspiration for a new norm that addresses automated and indiscriminate 
cyber attacks below the threshold of the use of force. It showed, first, that States have 
started to articulate a demand for such norms, as they are increasingly concerned 
about indiscriminate, automated cyber operations. Second, the paper argued that 
to ensure compliance with the norm in the context of automated cyber attacks, the 
IHL distinction between the nature of the capability and the use of the capability 
becomes meaningless, shifting the emphasis to the notion of an ‘indiscriminate cyber 
operation’. States should focus on reviewing the design of cyber operations to ensure 
that they avoid indiscriminate damage. In other words, if an automated operation is 
in its ‘nature’ designed to avoid indiscriminate damage, then its ‘use’ will be a direct 
reflection of that design. Third, the paper showed that reverse engineering malware 
after it has been found ‘in the wild’, which is routinely done in the aftermath of an 
operation to establish the attack’s source, also allows for a determination of whether 
a cyber operation’s designer sought to limit the harmful effects of the malware to 
non-target systems. Such forensic analyses are important as they provide a basis upon 
which States may determine if the attackers conformed with the norm and thus allow 
them to call out unacceptable behaviour (as part of their public attribution statements, 
for example) and set a normative benchmark. 
65 It is important to note that for the purposes of assessing compliance with the norm, it is irrelevant whether 
an operation was intentionally indiscriminate or indiscriminate due to coding errors or unforeseen 
interactions between systems. Indiscriminate spread due to negligence constitutes a breach of the norm.
